二十一世紀當代儒學論文集Ⅱ：儒學的全球在地化與當代文明

Anthology of 21st Century Confucianism Volume Two:
Glocalization of Confucianism and Contemporary Civilization

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The Net of Indra

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Because they have no Selfhood, the large and the small can mutually contain each other... Since the very small is very large Mount Sumeru is contained in a mustard seed; and since the very large is the very small, the ocean is included in a hair. Chengguan

0. Neo-Confucianism

Beginning in the Tang dynasty, Chinese philosophers started to make the remarkable fusion of prior views which we now call Neo-Confucianism. As the name suggests, Confucianism was the dominant element in the mixture, but Confucianism had always been primarily a social and political philosophy; it was weak in metaphysics. The Neo-Confucian philosophers tried to rectify this by building in elements from elsewhere, and especially from Buddhism. One of the most influential Buddhisms at the time was Huayan. Unsurprisingly, a number of its ideas were absorbed. As Wing-Tsit Chan puts it:[1]

> <In Huayan> the dharmas exist only in relation to each other and to the entire universe, which is a set of inter-relationships. It is too much to suggest that this is organic philosophy, but it certainly points in that direction. Huayan exercised a considerable influence on Neo-Confucianism chiefly because of this organic character. Its famous metaphor of the big ocean and many waves was taken over by Zhu Xi (1130-1200). The main concepts of Neo-Confucianism, those of principle <li> and material force <qi>, were derived through, if not from, those of principle <li> and fact <shi> in Hua-yen. Its one-is-all and all-is-one philosophy shows unmistakable Hua-yen imprints.

To understanding any view it is essential to understand its ontogenesis. Hence, to understand Neo-Confucianism, one has to understand the key metaphysical elements of Huayan. This is by no means easy, however, for the concepts are sophisticated and elusive. Helping to understand these elements is the aim of this essay. We will approach the matter via the central Huayen metaphor of the Net of Indra.

1 Chan 1969: 407.

1. Introduction

Huayan, or, as it is called in Japanese, Kegon, is one of the most intriguing forms of Mahāyāna Buddhism.[2] It paints a view of all things as interdependent and interpenetrating. Its most dominant metaphor, alluded to many times in the *Huayan* (Skrt. *Avataṃska*; Eng. Flower Garland) *Sūtra*, the key sūtra for this form of Buddhism, is the Net of Indra.[3] This is described by one commentator as follows:[4]

> Far away in the heavenly abode of the great god Indra, there is a wonderful net which has been hung by some cunning artificer in such a manner that it stretches out indefinitely in all directions. In accordance with the extravagant tastes of deities, the artificer has hung a single glittering jewel at the net's every node, and since the net itself is infinite in all dimensions, the jewels are infinite in number. There hang the jewels, glittering like stars of the first magnitude, a wonderful sight to behold. If we now arbitrarily select one of the jewels for inspection and look closely at it, we will discover that in its polished surface there are reflected all the other jewels in the net, infinite in number. Not only that, but each of the jewels reflected in this one jewel is also reflecting all the other jewels, so that the process of reflection is infinite.

In the metaphor, the jewels are the objects of reality—mountains and mustard seeds, oceans and hairs. Each encodes all the others. All interpenetrate in the great Dharmadhātu, the totality of all inter-related things.

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2 Commentators differ over some details of the interpretation of Huayan philosophy—though not the ones that will concern us here. Various accounts can be found in Chan 1969: Introduction; Chang 1972; Cook 1977; Cleary 1983: Introduction; Lusthaus 1998: sec. 8; Liu 2006: ch. 10; Williams 2009: ch. 6. The Lusthaus is a good concise statement of the matters that will concern us here. The Chan and Cleary references translate some of the most important Huayan texts. But as yet, few Huayan texts have been translated into English. In the quotations in the present essay, interpolations in square brackets are the translator's, and interpolations in angle brackets are mine. I have taken the liberty of changing Wade-Giles transliterations into Pinyin. All italics are original.

3 One standard translation is Cleary 1993. Another beautiful metaphor used in the sūtra to illustrate the same phenomenon is the Tower of Maitreya, a nesting of towers and their contents, possessing a fractal quality.

4 Cook 1977: 2. Fazang himself puts the matter somewhat more prosaically thus: 'It is like the net of Indra which is entirely made up of jewels. Due to their brightness and transparency, they reflect each other. In each of the jewels, the images of all the other jewels are [completely] reflected. This is the case with any one of the jewels, and will remain forever so. Now, if we take a jewel in the southwestern direction and examine it, [we can see] that this one jewel can reflect simultaneously the images of all other jewels at once. It is so with the one jewel, and is also so with each of all the others. Since each of the jewels simultaneously reflects the images of all other jewels at once, it follows that this jewel in the southwestern direction also reflects all the images of the jewels in each of the other jewels [at once]. It is so with this jewel, and is also so with all the others. Thus, the images multiply infinitely, and all these multiple infinite images are bright and clear inside this single jewel. The rest of the jewels can be understood in the same manner.' (Quoted in Liu 1982: 65.)

This is a beautiful metaphor. But what, exactly, does it mean? In what follows, I will provide an answer. I will do this in a perhaps unlikely way: with the help of a little contemporary mathematics—though as I will show, this does nothing more that bring out the content of Huayan views and give it a precision it could not otherwise aspire to.[5]

2. Identity

The relationship between the elements of reality, as Huayan conceives it, is often described as one of mutual identification, mutual containment, interconnectedness, interpenetration, non-obstruction, non-interference. (I will usually stick with 'interpenetration'.) This may help a little, but does not get us very far. The Chinese character often used for the relation is *ji* (Jap., *soku*), 即, a term which can bear many meanings, dependent on the context; and in any case, its use here is clearly a term of art. So this does not help much either.

A somewhat flat-footed interpretation of the notion is simply as one of numerical identity. Fazang (643-712) is officially the third Patriarch of Huayan, but is regarded by many as the effective founder of the school. And we find him saying—or translated as saying:[6]

> If we take ten coins as symbolizing the totality of existence, and examine the relationship of existence amongst them, then, according to Huayan teaching, coin one will be seen as identical with the other nine coins.

And his commentator, Cook, says, concerning another passage by Fazang:[7]

> This passage makes it clear that Fazang does in fact assert the identity of the rafter and the building, or, in other words, the part and the whole, or the particular and the universal.

Now, a feature of identity is that it is normally taken as supporting the substitution of identicals: if *x* and *y* are identical, then anything true of *x* is true of *y*. And we do indeed find Fazang reasoning sometimes in a way that suggests this:[8]

> *Question*: since the building is identical with the rafter, then the remaining planks, tiles, and so on, must be identical with the rafter, aren't they? *Answer*: generally speaking, they are all identical with the rafter

The reasoning here would appear to be that if *r* is any rafter, *p* is any plank, and *b* is the whole building, then since *r*=*b* and *p*=*b*, *r* = *p*. This is an instance of the substitution of identicals.

5 The material is put in a broader context in Priest 2014: Part 3.
6 Cook 1977: 2. The coins are clearly metaphors for the elements of reality.
7 Cook 1977: 79. The rafters and planks here are metaphors for the elements of reality; the building is a metaphor for the totality.
8 Cook 1977: 82.

Note that Fazang endorses the interpenetration between the part and the whole. This, itself, would seem to rule out the interpretation of interpenetration as identity. A car is not identical with its steering wheel. But worse follows. The interpretations quickly collapses into what amounts, effectively, to trivialism: nearly everything is true. Consider me. Take any property, *P*, and some object with that property. Then since I am that thing, I have the property *P*. This seems far too strong. There is clearly some sense in which I am not a slice of toast; and for all that George Bush and I may be one, I am not responsible for the invasion of Iraq and its consequences in the way that he is. Indeed, the passage just quoted does not, in fact, require the relation to be identity. Any transitive relation will do. So it would seem that whatever the notion is, it is not one of literal identity.[9]

3 Emptiness

Cook himself gestures at another understanding of what the relation might be. We often say that things are the same, meaning by this that they have a property in common. The ripe strawberry and the top traffic light are the same in that they are both red. In the present case, this seems far too weak an understanding, however. Any two things have some properties in common—for example, the property of being one thing. So this is to reduce the relation to banality.

But maybe, says Cook, to say that things are related in the way we seek, is to say that they have some *really important* property in common. What? Says Cook:[10]

> First, we must accept the basic concept of emptiness itself. Second, we must consider emptiness to be so fundamental to the being of things that despite their obvious and real differences, they are alike in a more essential way in being empty. If we can accept these premises, then the claim that all things are identical does not seem quite so improbable, because identity is claimed on the basis of this common emptiness.

Emptiness, that is, being empty (*śūnya*), is the central metaphysical notion of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Its importance was first articulated by Nāgārjuna, the founder of the Madhyamka school. To be empty is to have no *svabhāva*. This is a difficult term to translate; it is often translated as *self-being*, or *intrinsic nature*. Roughly, a svabhāvic entity is one that is a metaphysical atom (like Hume's distinct existences, or the simples of the *Tractatus*). It is one whose nature is independent of all other things. A non-svabhāvic entity, by contrast, is one whose nature is *secundum quid*: the entity possesses it only in virtue of its relationship to other things.[11] And, crucially, all things are empty. This indeed is their fundamental nature.

9 Interestingly, Ziporyn 2013 does defend a trivialist interpretation of the closely related school of Chinese Buddhism, Tianti. This is discussed and rejected in Deguchi, Garfield, and Priest 2013.

10 Cook 1977: 62.

11 One of the most important relations in question is the relationship to mind/language, though this will not play any role in what follows. For more on the notion of emptiness see Garfield's commentary in Garfield (1995).

As Nāgārjuna puts it in his autocommentary to the *Vigrahvyāvartanī*, quoting the *Aṣṭasāhasrikikā Prajñāpārāmita Sūtra*:[12]

> By their nature, things are not a determinate entity. Their nature is a non-nature; it is their non-nature that is their nature. For they have only one nature, i.e., no nature…

Indeed, the 'everything' is to be taken *very* seriously: even emptiness itself is empty.

The view was taken over, endorsed, and developed, by Chinese Buddhism in general, and Huayan in particular. As Fazang himself puts it:[13]

> The all is the one, for both are similar in being non-existent in Nature <svabhāva>.
>
> <Things> are produced by the mind and have no self-nature at all. This is called the absence of characters. The scripture says, "All dharmas are originally empty in their nature and have not the least character".

Now, according to Cook, to say that all things are one is to say that they share this one (non-) nature. They are the same in this most fundamental of ways. That all things are one, in this sense, is stating an important truth of Buddhism, and one of the appropriate profundity. However, it really doesn't seem to do justice to the metaphor of the Net of Indra. According to the metaphor, all things interpenetrate with all other things. To grasp one is, in some sense, to grasp all. This seems to go a lot further than the simple claim that all things share the same fundamental property. You can know everything about *a* and know that *a* and *b* share this most fundamental property without knowing much else about *b*. The Indranet[14] must be at least powerful as the internet!

4. … and its Structure

But Cook's insight, that emptiness is important to what is going on, at least takes us in the right direction. To understand how, we need to look more closely at the nature of emptiness. If something is empty, its identity is determined by its locus (location) in a certain a network of relations. A thing's being what it is, is its bearing a bunch of relations to other things.

A perhaps helpful way of understanding this, especially for those coming from a background of Western philosophy, is by thinking of Leibniz' notion of time. What is it to be a particular time, say 1066? According to Newton, times are things existing in and of themselves. They would have been there, even had the universe been empty of all matter and events. By contrast, Leibniz gave a relational account of time. To be 1066 is to be before Britain's colonization of Australia, after Caesar's invasion of Britain, contemporary with the

12 Battacharya, Johnston, and Kunst 1978: 23.
13 Chang 1969: 410, 416. See also Liu 2006: 251.
14 Thanks to Galen Strawson for the phrase.

Norman invasion of Britain, and so on. 1066 is simply a locus in a set of temporal relations between events. Does that mean that it does not exist? In a sense, yes: the time does not exist in the way that Newton took it to; it has no intrinsic existence. In a sense no: Leibniz would not deny that there was a 1066; but it exists and is what it is only as this locus in a bunch of relations.[15]

Similarly, what is it to be Graham Priest? My being is constituted by having been born in London in 1948, being the child of George and Laura, residing most of my adult life in Australia, being the father

of Marcus and Annika, dying in ?, and so on. Anything that related to those things in those ways would be me; there is no *ding an sich*, Graham Priest. I am essentially constituted by my place in that web of relations.[16]

We may represent this graphically. Suppose, for the sake of illustration, that my being is constituted by relating to three objects, *a*, *b*, and *c*. Then we might depict the situation thus:



where the labels on the arrows indicate the relations in question. Anything at the spot marked o would, *ipso facto*, be me.[17]

Note that relations have a direction, marked by the direction of the arrow. (Brutus killing Caesar is not the same as Caesar killing Brutus.) It will be helpful in what follows to arrange for all the arrows to point in the same direction.[18] One can do this because every relation, ρ, has a converse, ρ^c. $y\rho x$ iff $x\rho^c y$; and both of these say the same thing. So we can always replace an arrow pointing in the wrong direction,, $x \xleftarrow{\rho} y$ with one pointing in the right direction,. $x \xrightarrow{\rho^c} y$ [19]

15 See, further, Priest 2009.

16 How wide is the web of identity-constituting relations? Does it contain the relationship between me and a flower in the Central Australian desert, holding in virtue of the fact that I am drinking tea when it is blossoming? Or does it contain only those relations that are "essential", in some appropriate sense. The question, though interesting, is one which we do not need to resolve here. Two things are worth noting, though. The relations cannot comprise all relations-in-extension. If all such were deployed, there would be non-trivial permutations of the domain, and so a locus would not individuate an object uniquely. Secondly, however sparse the relations, because of the nature of ultimate reality, the web will end up relating all objects to all objects, as we shall see in due course.

17 This analysis takes the notion of a locus for granted, and it might therefore be thought that it takes loci to have self-being. However, a more complicated analysis shows how loci themselves can be seen as empty. See Priest 2009.

18 This is not essential, but it makes it much easier to picture what is going on.

19 Relations can also have more than two places. However, we can think of the relation $\rho x_1 \ldots x_n$, where $n>2$, as a binary relation between x_1 and an ordered $(n-1)$-tuple, thus: $x_1 \rho < x_2, \ldots, x_n >$.

Of course, since the *a*, *b*, and *c* in the diagram are themselves empty, the same analysis must be applied to them. They themselves are nothing more than loci in a field of relations. We might depict this as follows (using the magic number three again, and ignoring the superscripts on the arrows for perspicuity):



Each of the a_is, b_is and c_is, must be treated in the same way, of course. On ultimate analysis, then, the original object turns out to be the locus which is the root of a tree which is infinite along every branch, of the following kind:



In the end, all content has disappeared. What is left is pure form—structure. Indeed, what the tree gives is exactly the ontological structure of the object.[20]

20 One might worry at this point that there are enough different tree structures to provide sufficient discrimination between objects, especially when one notes that the relations themselves are empty, and so must be individuated by their own structural trees (and so in indefinitely). A simple model showing this to be possible is as follows. Take a model, *M*, of *ZF* set theory, including the Axiom of Foundation. And let *s* be the sets of some level, *l*, in the cumulative hierarchy in *M*. Take any member of this, *x*, and consider its membership tree. That is, *x* is at the root; and the descendents of any node in the tree are its members. Distinct members of *s* have distinct trees, and so can be individuated by these trees. Moreover, the membership relation restricted to *s*

5. Interpenetration

And now, something interesting can happen. Consider, say, the north pole of a magnet *n*. This is a north pole only because it relates to the south pole, *s*, in a certain way, ρ. The north pole could not be what it is if there were no south pole. Hence, its structural tree will look like this. (I record which object is at each node, so that one may keep track of matters, but label only the relation ρ to avoid clutter.)



As one might expect, the tree of *s* is a part of the tree of *n*.

But of course, *s* is symmetrically related to *n*. So if we fill out the tree a bit further, we will get the following:



The tree of *n* is part of the tree of *s*![21] The two objects intermingle in the most intimate way. The structure of each is literally a part of the other. Note that this can happen only because the trees of both *n* and *s* are infinite. If either were finite, the situation could not arise.

At any rate, one could not hope for a nicer representation of the idea that the two objects "interpenetrate". The ontological structure of each contains (encodes) the ontological structure of the other. The relation of two trees each being a sub-tree of the other is

from *l* in the cumulative hierarchy. This can therefore be individuated by its membership tree in exactly the same way – and so on up. One might think that the branches of each of these trees in finite, because of the Axiom of Foundation, and that this finitude is playing an essential role in this argument. It is not. We can take *M* to be a non-standard model in which the membership relation is not well founded (despite the fact that this is a model of Foundation). The branches of the membership tree may then be infinite.

21 To be a bit more precise, this is up to isomorphism. The tree for n has a sub-tree which is isomorphic to the tree for s (which tree has, therefore, sub-trees which are isomorphic to the whole tree). But we may simply identify isomorphic trees.

obviously a symmetric and transitive relation.[22] The Huayan notion of interpenetration may be taken to be exactly this.

6. *Li* and *Shi*

We are not finished with the story yet, though. There is a standard distinction in Mahāyāna Buddhism between two realities, conventional and ultimate. Conventional reality is constituted by the phenomenological objects of common experience, such as Mount Sumeru and a hair. These are empty. Ultimate reality is the reality that appears once one strips away the reification of conventional thought: emptiness itself (*śūnyata, kong* 空). As already noted, though, it would be a serious mistake to reify this. Like everything else, it is empty.

Since this ultimate reality is empty, it has only relational nature, and it is at the root of a structural tree of its own. What does it relate to? The objects of conventional reality. It relates to these in the profoundest of ways. For a start, each phenomenal object could not be what it is if it were not a manifestation of this ultimate reality. But conversely, ultimate reality could not exists if it did not manifest itself through these phenomena.[23] In his *Treatise on the Golden Lion*, Fazang explains the relationship between the two using the metaphor of a statue of a lion made of gold. Ultimate reality is the gold; the phenomenal world is the lion-appearance (so that its elements are the eye, the ear). And one cannot have the one without the other.

Thus, ultimate reality and the objects of phenomenal reality are like two sides of the same coin. Each can be what it is only given the other. In other words, they interpenetrate. They play north and south to each other. Let us write *e* for ultimate reality, and *a*, *b*, *c*,… for the objects of phenomenal reality. Then what we have seen is that the trees of *e* and *a* (and *b*, *c*) are as follows:



For future reference, call this diagram ***D***. And what ***D*** shows is that emptiness interpenetrates with every object.

22 It does no harm to allow sub-trees to be improper, making the relationship reflexive as well, and so an equivalence relation.

23 For a discussion of conventional and ultimate reality in Chinese Buddhism, see Priest 2010.

Neither is this simply an artifact of the diagram: it is a core Huayan thesis. In Chinese Buddhism, ultimate reality goes by many names (emptiness, Buddha Nature). In Huayan, it is standardly called, *li* 理 (principle).[24] The objects of conventional (phenomenal) reality are referred to as *shi* 事 (event, fact). Huayen isolates four features of the dharmadhātu.[25] The first is the existence of the objects of phenomenal reality, shi. The second is the existence of ultimate reality, li. The third is exactly that li and shi interpenetrate, *lishi wuai*, 理事無礙法. (The fourth we will come back to in a moment.)

This interpenetration is expressed by Dushun (557-640), the First Patriarch of Huayan, in his *Meditation on the Dharmadhātu*, as follows:[26]

> Li, the law that extends everywhere, has no boundaries or limitations, but shi, the objects that are embraced by li, have limitations and boundaries. In each and every shi, the li spreads all over without omission or deficiency. Why? *Because* the truth of li is indivisible. Thus, each and every minute atom absorbs and embraces the infinite truth of li in a perfect and complete manner.
>
> Shi, the matter that embraces, has boundaries and limitations, and li, the truth that is embraced [by things], has no boundaries or limitations. Yet this limited shi is completely identical, not partially identical, with li. Why? Because shi has no substance <svabhāva>—it is the selfsame li. Therefore, without causing the slightest damage to itself, an atom can embrace the whole universe. If one atom is so, all other dharmas should also be so. Contemplate on this.

Before we leave the matter, one further comment. The relationship between conventional and ultimate reality, shi and li, is a somewhat vexed one in Madhyamaka Buddhism.[27] In some sense, they are distinct; in some sense they are one. The graphical representation of the relation provides a very clear articulation of the matter. First, emptiness, *e*, is empty. That is, it itself is the root of a non-well-founded tree. Next, it and the elements of conventional reality are distinct: they have different trees. But, finally, *e* is identical with conventional reality, in the sense that it interpenetrates every one of its objects. The tree for each such object is both a part of, and has as a part, the tree for *e*.

7. *Shi* and *Shi*

We are still not finished. If *a* and *b* are shi, phenomena, then *a* interpenetrates with *e*, and *e* interpenetrates with *b*. But interpenetration is, as I noted, transitive. So *a* interpenetrates with *b*. One can see this diagrammatically. Come back to our diagram ***D***. As this shows, the tree of *c* is a sub-tree of the tree of *b*. Symmetrically, of course, the tree of *b*

24 See Lusthaus 1998, Liu 2006: 248.
25 See Lusthaus 1998.
26 Chang 1972: 144-5.
27 See, e.g., the papers in Cowherds 2010.

is a sub-tree of *c*—though this goes off the diagram. (The tree for *b* is a sub-tree of the tree for *e*, which is a sub-tree of the tree for *c*.) Hence, all shi interpenetrate. This is, in fact, the fourth Huayan principle: the interpenetration of shi and shi, *shishi wuai*, 事事無礙法界. All phenomena interpenetrate. Chengguan (738-839?), the Fourth Patriarch of Huayan, puts it thus:[28]

> Because they have no Selfhood <svabhāva>, the large and the small can mutually contain each other... Since the very small is very large Mount Sumeru is contained in a mustard seed; and since the very large is the very small, the ocean is included in a hair.

And Fazang thus:[29]

> <A particle of dust> has the characters of roundness and smallness. This is a fact <shi>. Its nature is empty and non-existent. This is principle <li>. Because facts have no substance <svabhāva> they merge together in accordance with principle. And because the dust has no substance, it universally penetrates everything. For all facts are no different from principle and they are completely manifested in the dust.

And as both Chengguan and Fazang say, and ***D*** shows, all this is possible only because all things are empty—and so have infinite structural trees.[30]

Note that if all objects interpenetrate then the object which is a whole interpenetrates with an object which is its part. Thus, the car does interpenetrate with its steering wheel.[31] Moreover, a special case of this is when the whole is the whole which is the totality of reality, the whole Net of Indra, the one. This interpenetrates with each other object.[32] Thus, as Fazang says:[33]

> All phenomena are in great profusion, and are interfused but not mixed (losing their identity). The all is the one, for both are similar in being non-existent in nature. And the one is the all for the relation of cause and effect are perfectly clear. As the power [of the one] and the function [of the many] embrace each other, their expansion and contraction are free and at ease.

28 Chang 1972: 165.
29 Chan 1969: 420.
30 Fazang again: 'Only when we understand that [dharmas] have no nature [of their own] can we have wisdom about the one and the many'. (Chan 1969: 423.)
31 For a discussion of the Huayan view that a whole interpenetrates with any part, see Jones 2009.
32 Representing this fact would seem to outstrip the mathematical machinery at hand, but it does not. It cannot be represented using standard set-theory, but it can be represented using the mathematics of non-well-founded sets. Given this apparatus, a node on the tree can be the whole tree. Thus, for example, given a tree, *t* (which is a set of ordered pairs) with root, *r*. The set, **x**, which is a solution to the equation $\mathbf{x} = \{< \mathbf{x}, r >\} \cup t$ is a tree which is its own root. See, e.g., Barwise and Etchemendy 1987: ch. 3, or Aczel 1988: ch. 1.
33 Chan 1969: 410.

8. The Net Appears

We are now nearly at the end of our journey, but there is one final step. Let us return to the Net of Indra. Consider once more the diagram ***D***. *e* is its root; but as we know, the tree for *e* is also a sub-tree of other trees. We may therefore extend the picture indefinitely to the left as well (though the result is no longer a tree). If we do so, we get:



or, to reorient the arrows a bit, and ignore some repetitions:



The Net or Indra literally appears, a graphic depiction of the great Dharmadhātu.

Let us give the last word to Fazang, again from the *Treatise on the Golden Lion* (recall that the parts of the lion shape represent phenomenal objects):[34]

> In each of the lion's eyes, ears, limbs, joints, and in each and every hair, there is the golden lion. All the lions embraced by all the single hairs simultaneously and instantaneously enter into a single hair. Thus in each and every hair is an infinite number of lions, and in addition all the single hairs, together with the infinite number of lions, in turn enter into a single hair. In this way, the geometric progression is infinite, like the jewels of Celestial Lord Indra's Net.[35]

34 Chan 1969: 412.

35 This paper was initially drafted while I was a visiting professor at the Graduate School of Letters, Kyoto University. I am very grateful to them for their generous and friendly hospitality. Versions of it were given at the conference *Analytic Philosophy and Asian Thought*

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